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Abstract  The ubiquity of portable wireless-enabled computing and communications 
devices has stimulated the emergence of malicious codes (wireless worms) that are 
capable of spreading between spatially proximal devices. The potential exists for 
worms to be opportunistically transmitted between devices as they move around, so 
human mobility patterns will have an impact on epidemic spread. The scenario we 
address in this paper is proximity attacks from fleetingly in-contact wireless devices 
with short-range communication range, such as Bluetooth-enabled smart phones.  
An individual-based model of mobile devices is introduced and the effect of 
population characteristics and device behaviour on the outbreak dynamics is 
investigated. We show through extensive simulations that in the above scenario the 
resulting mass-action epidemic models remain applicable provided the contact rate is 
derived consistently from the underlying mobility model. The model gives useful 
analytical expressions against which more refined simulations of worm spread can be 
developed and tested.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The modern world has become increasingly mobile. As a result, traditional ways of 
connecting computing devices to the Internet (and to each other) via physical cables 
have proved inadequate. Recent years have seen the widespread adoption of portable 
computing devices which are equipped with a short-range wireless technology such as 
WiFi [1] or Bluetooth [2]. Wireless connectivity is greatly advantageous as it poses no 
restriction on the users mobility and allows a great deal of flexibility. At the same 
time the ability to wirelessly connect to the Internet and other devices, and to transfer 
data on the move, is opening opportunities for hackers to exploit such features for 
launching  new and previously unexplored security attacks on computer and 
communication networks [3, 4, 5, 6]. 
 
Indeed, the last few years have seen the emergence of a new class of potentially 
destructive computer viruses that exploit such wireless capabilities in order to spread 
themselves between nearby devices, often without any active user involvement. 
One important feature of these new types of computer worms is that they do not 
require Internet connectivity for their propagation and therefore can spread without 
being detected by existing security systems. Another important feature is that, since 
they target portable devices, they can exploit the mobility of users for their spreading, 
in a way which shows interesting analogies with the spread of infectious diseases in a 
human population. 
 
The spread of such wireless epidemics [4, 5] among WiFi-enabled computers placed 
at fixed locations has been investigated very recently [5]. These studies have revealed 
that the patterns of epidemic spreading in such networks are greatly different from the 
much studied epidemics in wired networks, and are strongly influenced by the spatial 
nature of these networks and the specifics of wireless communication. 
 
The above static description is relevant in a situation where the underlying wireless 
contact network along which the epidemic spread is either connected or has a very 
large connected component. However, when  device density is low or the infected 
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devices have a very limited communication range (e.g. in the case of  Bluetooth-
enabled mobile phones [3]), at any time instant the underlying wireless contact 
network will be fragmented into many isolated clusters, rendering network 
propagation ineffective.  In such situations, we expect the worm spreading to take 
place in an opportunistic manner where infected devices exploit the mobility of the 
users to transmit the worm to other devices to which they make a fleeting contact. The 
temporal patterns of such contacts and their duration depend on the underlying 
movement patterns of user mobility [7]. Therefore, in order to model the opportunistic 
spread of wireless worms between portable devices it will be necessary to develop a 
class of epidemic models that reflect the characteristics of human mobility, patterns of 
population aggregation and the wireless nature of worm transmission between devices 
[8]. Such models will inform the construction of mitigation strategies aimed at 
containing and eliminating future worm epidemics.  
 
Here we present a model for the epidemic dynamics of a worm outbreak in a mobile 
spatially distributed population of wireless-enabled devices. Whilst worm spreading 
in fixed and ad-hoc networks has begun to be investigated in some detail [5, 6], the 
opportunistic spread between spatially proximal mobile devices has received less 
attention. The model elaborated below is constructed so as to reflect device mobility 
as well as the transmission characteristics of the worm. The transmission 
characteristics are determined by the wireless technology that is used for inter-device 
communication. Specifically, we show that in the above low density regime worm 
epidemics can be described by standard mass-action mixing models provided the 
contact rate is obtained self-consistently within the model itself.  
 
The model framework presented here provides a number of analytic results, which are 
verified via individual-based simulations. These results are important in quantifying 
the impact of device mobility on the spreading of worms and other types of viruses in 
mobile wireless networks. Our results are also relevant to the analysis of novel delay-
tolerant communication protocols which are being intensively researched for 
information dissemination and routing in intermittently connected wireless networks 
[9]. 
 
 
 5
2. Opportunistic Transmission Model in a Mobile Population 
 
2.1 Contact rate calculation 
 
It is necessary to first calculate the contact rate between individuals in a mobile 
spatially distributed population. To do this, the motion-dependent contact rate for a 
given individual (denoted i) with others in the population is calculated [10, 11]. The 
contact process model consists of a population of individuals that are randomly and 
uniformly distributed over a two-dimensional domain with a density ρ . As illustrated 
in Figure 1 each individual moves independently of the others with a constant 
straight-line velocity v
r
, with their direction vectors distributed uniformly in azimuth 
in the plane. A specified individual, i, is introduced and moves through the domain 
with velocity iv
ur
. If one of the individuals passes within a radius R  of the specified 
individual i then, by definition, a contact has been made. Here we initially 
constrain R l<< , where l  is the mean inter-particle spacing. Additionally we insist 
that the length scale of the domain Γ >> l, giving R l<< << Γ . (Later we investigate 
the effects of relaxing this constraint). Figure 2 shows the geometry of the interaction. 
In order for an individual to be exposed to contact by i during a time period dt the 
individual must lie within the rectangular-shaped area swept by the motion of i lying 
along the direction of the vector iw v v= −
ur ur r
. The area swept in this time 
period 2dA Rwdt= , where the relative speed is given by ( )1/ 22 2 2 cosi iw v v v v φ= + − , 
where φ  is the angle between the velocity vectors. 
 
Given the independent motions of the particles, the density of individuals with 
velocity vectors with directions in the range φ  and dφ φ+  is 2dρ φ π  [12]. Therefore, 
the average number of individuals entering the swept area in 
dt is 2 2dN Rwd dtφ ρ φ π= . In order to obtain the total number of individuals 
encountering i it is necessary to integrate over the planar angleφ . Hence, the number 
of individuals entering the area around i bounded by the radius R , i.e. the mean 
contact rate CR, is given by: 
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2 2
0 0
dN RCR wd
dt
π π
φ ρ φ
π
= =∫ ∫  (1) 
 
Substituting for w gives: 
 
 ( )2 1/ 22 2
0
2 cosi i
RCR v v v v d
πρ φ φ
π
= + −∫  (2) 
 
Equation 2 reduces to  
 
 ( ) ( )2 1/ 22
0
4 1 sini
RCR v v m d
π
ρ
ω ω
π
= + −∫  (3) 
 
where ( )24 i im vv v v= + . This is an elliptic integral of the second kind [13] and can 
be written in standard notation: 
 
 ( ) ( )4 iCR R v v E mρπ= +  (4) 
 
To simplify what follow, assume that the index individual moves with the same 
speed v as the rest of the population, so the contact rate can be written 
 
 8CR R vρ
π
= . (5) 
 
It is generally the case that individuals in a population move with a range of different 
speeds. It has been shown in [11] that when the individual speeds are distributed 
according to a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution, for example, equation 5 becomes 
 
 8CR R vρ
π
=  (6) 
 
where v is the mean population speed, so it is possible to accommodate a distribution 
of individuals speeds within this framework.  
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2.2 Worm transmission 
 
If we now equate the distance R with the communication range of a wireless device 
and assume that there is a single infected device that is capable of transmitting a 
wireless worm with probability p to any other wireless device that finds itself within 
the range set by R, the rate of generation of new infected devices (I) is given by 
 
 8dI R vp
dt
ρ
π
=  (7) 
    
 
The secondary infectives go on to infect other uninfected devices, so when many 
infectives are present, then, assuming there is a density of iρ  infectives and 
sρ uninfected devices (i.e. susceptibles S) in the domain, the rate of generation of 
infectives per unit area is given by: 
 
 1 8 s i
dI Rvp
A dt
ρ ρ
π
=  (8) 
 
It is often easiest to consider changes to the population sizes when investigating the 
dynamics of the infection, so converting equation 13 to population sizes results in: 
 
 1 8dI Rvp S I
A dt A Aπ
=  (9) 
 
And this reduces to 
 
 8dI Rv p SI
dt N
ρ
π
=  (10) 
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or  
 
 dI SI
dt N
β=  (11) 
where  
 8Rv pρβ
π
=  (12) 
 
Equation 11 is the standard frequency dependent mass-action assumption [14] that is 
widely used in epidemic modelling, where ρ is the total population density and N is 
the total population size, i.e. /N Aρ = . However, in epidemic models, the 
transmission rate,β , is usually determined by the empirically observed basic 
reproductive rate of the pathogen, whereas here we are able to relate this term to the 
underlying population motion and transmission behaviour.   
 
 
2.3 Refinement of the basic model 
 
In the basic contact process described above, any uninfected wireless device that 
passes within the communication radius R of an infected device for a fleeting duration 
is just as likely to get infected (with probability p) as one that passes very close to the 
infective. In practice, however, it is likely that the longer an uninfected device is 
within range of an infected one the greater the probability that a worm transmission 
event will occur. To address this refinement, we introduce the idea of transmission 
profile.  
 
The transmission profile will be determined by the radial decay of radio frequency 
signal strength within the region bounded by R. Any susceptible traversing a straight-
line path within R will experience an exposure to worm transmission that is both 
dependent upon this profile and its path length through the domain bounded by R. 
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Susceptibles passing closer to an infective will spend longer close to an infective and 
be exposed to higher integrated signal strength than a susceptible further away. Figure 
3 shows two individuals traversing the communication region of a wireless device but 
with differing closest points of approach.  
 
Denoting the path length function by ( )l r , and the transmission profile by ( )f r , the 
probability that an uninfected device gets infected ( ) ( ) ( )p r l r f r∝ . For a circular 
domain of radius R, 2 2 1/ 2( ) 2( )l r R r= − . 
 
Usually, the transmission profile will be proportional to the RF signal power at the 
receiving device, which is typically modelled as transP cr
α
∝ where c and α  are 
environmentally dependent [15]. For simplicity, adopting the transmission model 
described by Glauche et al. [16] and Nekovee [5], we assume that each wireless 
device can establish links with devices within the transmission range R, whereas for 
devices beyond R connection is not possible. In this case the transmission profile is 
independent of the radial distance within R so ( )f r k= . Consequently, the probability 
that an uninfected device becomes infected is ( )1/ 22 2( ) 2p r R r k= − . To normalise the 
probability distribution, if an uninfected device collides with an infective there is a 
probability p that the susceptible becomes infected, i.e. (0) 2p p Rk= = , so the 
constant 2k p R= . Therefore, ( )1/ 22 2( ) pp r R rR= − . The overall transmission rate for 
the uniform contagion profile is 
 
 ( )1/ 22 2
0
8 R pv R r dr
R
β ρ
π
= −∫  (13) 
 
which gives 
 
 2R vpβ ρ=  (14) 
 
Therefore, taking into account the time spent by a susceptible within R reduces the 
rate of production of infectives to around 80% of that seen in the basic contact process 
model (c.f. equation 12). It is possible that more complex radial dependencies for the 
transmission model might be applicable depending upon the environment in which the 
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transmissions are being made. The adoption here of the transmission model presented 
by Nekovee [5] permits an analytic expression for the transmission parameter to be 
derived. More complex transmission models can be straightforwardly accommodated 
within this framework, but a numerical evaluation of the necessary integrals would be 
required.  
 
 
3. Implications for the epidemiology of wireless worms 
 
Above we have introduced a model for the spread of malicious code entities between 
wireless enabled devices. The model has been constructed with the explicit 
recognition of device mobility. Using the model it is possible to explore the behaviour 
of worm epidemics in mobile devices. 
 
Consider a population of N individual devices existing at a densityρ and moving with 
a mean speed v . Assume each device has a wireless communications radius R. If a 
worm is introduced into the system each device can be either uninfected (susceptible, 
S), infected (I) or recovered (P) (i.e. a patch has been added to render the device 
unable to infect other devices and no longer capable of being re-infected).   
 
In a finite population of fixed size, the worm epidemic is described by 
 
 2dS SIR vp
dt N
ρ= −  (15) 
 
  
 2dI SIR vp I
dt N
ρ δ= −  (16) 
 
 
 dP I
dt
δ=  (17) 
 
 
For an epidemic to take off, the initial infected device needs to generate a positive 
number of infected devices, i.e. 0 at 0dI dt t>  . For this condition to hold 
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 2R vpρ δ>  (18) 
 
In this scenario the epidemic will always die out eventually ( 0,I t→ →∞ ), but the 
sum of those devices in the population that get infected with the worm is given by the 
solution of the transcendental equation 
 
 
2
1
R vp P
NP N e
ρ
δ ∞−
∞
 
= −  
 
 (19) 
 
Where P
∞
is the limiting number of recovered devices as t →∞  (i.e. the sum of all 
those infected during the course of the epidemic). Note that there is a critical device 
density 2c Rvpρ δ=  below which no worm epidemic is possible.  
 
 
From this it is apparent how the proportion of devices infected during an outbreak is 
dependent on the model parameters. Figure 4 shows a comparison of the time-
dependence of the number of infectives from the model (equations 15-17) with a 
simulation of the process. In this simulation we took a typical urban population 
density of 3000 individuals/km2 with a mean speed of around 2km/day, with p=0.1. It 
was assumed that each wireless device has a transmission radius of 5m, and such a 
transmission range corresponds to that seen in a Class 2 Bluetooth device [2, 7]. In 
this case the epidemic dynamics result from the aggregated effect of numerous dyadic 
transmission events, because at any given time each device will almost never have 
more than one other wireless device within its transmission range ( )-34x3x10 0.2π  . 
Channel access protocols such as medium access control (MAC) [5] have minimal 
impact, as there are rarely any other competing devices within the transmission range 
of an infected device. Consequently, the epidemic characteristics are well described 
by a standard mass-action model.  
 
Next, it is of interest to investigate what happens as the wireless device transmission 
range R is increased from 10m to 40m, which is more typical of Class 1 Bluetooth 
devices. Figure 5 shows a series of epidemic curves for increasing wireless 
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transmission range, R, and using the same simulation parameters as previously. As R 
increases the epidemic dynamics, although occurring on a faster time-scale, remain 
mass-action like. The results of a basic mass-action model (equations 15-17) are 
shown for comparison and the agreement between simulation and theory is good. 
Although each simulation is a single realisation of what is a stochastic process, at this 
level the fluctuations are minimal. As R gets large the beginnings of a deviation 
between the SIR model and the simulation is becoming evident for this single 
realisation of the dynamics.       
 
In addition to the radius of wireless transmission, R, there is also the probability of 
worm transmission, p. It is possible that a channel allocation protocol such as MAC 
might serve to lower the transmission probability, p, as R increases. This is because 
increasing numbers of devices find themselves within the transmission range, so the 
listen-before-talk aspect of MAC reduces the opportunities for transmission. In effect, 
as R increases p decreases, so (depending on the specific details of the protocol) the 
product Rp in equation 14 may remain relatively constant. Therefore, as the 
transmitter range increases, if a channel allocation protocol is in operation, there may 
not be the expected increase in the transmission rate of the pathogen. This effect is 
rather like the self-throttling behaviour noted by Nekovee [5] in the spread of 
worms in wireless ad-hoc networks. Channel allocation protocols serve to inhibit 
worm spread and could be regarded as a potential means to intervene in eliminating 
worm epidemics.   
 
From this it is possible to see that within the same population, the resultant worm 
dynamics will be dependent upon the characteristics of the devices. Widely different 
epidemic outbreaks are possible as the parameters relating to the devices changes. In 
real populations the transmission range of each device may well be influenced by the 
local environment (i.e. by the presence of wall, buildings etc) so it is possible that not 
all identical wireless devices will have a similar communication properties.       
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Conclusions 
 
The threat of attack from malicious code is rapidly increasing as wireless technology 
becomes routinely packaged in information processing and communication devices. 
Understanding the dynamics of these wireless worm epidemics will be essential to 
devising efficient intervention schemes to protect users and maintain network 
functionality. Just as in human disease epidemiology, mathematical modelling has a 
key role to play in developing this understanding of worm epidemiology. Using an 
individual-based approach we have developed a contact process model for the 
interaction of a population of interacting mobile devices. The model shows how the 
epidemic dynamics are influenced by factors such as host speed, worm transmission 
probability and device transmission range. Specifically, we have shown that both for 
short-range and longer range transmitters the epidemic dynamics in the low density 
limit are captured by a standard mass-action epidemic model where the transmission 
rate is set by the factors such as population density, device transmission range and 
speed. Agreement between the simulation of worm spread in a mobile population and 
a simple epidemic model is good. However, as device transmission range increases 
the impact of channel allocation algorithms plays an increasing role in influencing the 
probability of worm transmission (this is particularly the case for WiFi 
communication, where devices have to contend for a limited number of 
communication channels). Such protocols serve to inhibit the rate of epidemic spread 
and serve to reduce the overall transmission term for the epidemic.   
 
Wireless epidemics will reflect the aggregation and movement of humans, so many of 
the techniques of conventional epidemiology will be needed to better reflect 
outbreaks. In the model here, future refinements are needed to better understand the 
impact of more complex movement patterns (other than straight-line) and to consider 
inhomogeneities in the distribution of the population. Also, in parallel with these 
developments, the effect of channel allocation protocols needs to be investigated in 
more detail. Furthermore, when the density of devices is sufficiently high such that 
large network clusters can emerge, the spreading dynamics becomes increasingly 
more affected by network correlation effects, which are not included in the standard 
mass action epidemic models. Such effects, however, can be described using models 
from spatial epidemics, and will be considered in future work. 
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Figure Captions 
 
 
Figure 1: A specified individual is located at the centre of the large (dashed) 
circle, radius R, and is moving through the domain in a straight line. Other individuals 
move across the domain in straight lines; velocity vectors are uniformly distributed in 
azimuth. When an individual passes within a distance R of the specified individual 
contact is made with probability p.  All the particles are treated as point-like. 
 
Figure 2:  Geometry of the interaction between a specified individual and another 
individual in the population. The movement of all the individuals takes place in the x, 
y plane. A specified individual, i, situated at the co-ordinate origin moves with 
velocity vector iv  (dashed line) along the negative y axis, whilst another individual 
with which it will make contact moves with velocity vectorv . These vectors are at an 
angleϕ . The vector w  is the relative velocity vector of the two individuals. The area 
of hazard for the non-specified individual ( 2dA Rwdt= ) is given by the lozenge-
shaped area minus the semicircular end pieces.   
 
Figure 3: Two devices passing within R but on different trajectories. They are exposed 
to differing risk of infection due to the differing time they spend within the region R 
centred on an infected wireless device. 
 
Figure 4: Infection curve for the epidemic model and a simulation (R = 5m). The time 
dependence of the number of infected devices from the simulation is shown (dots). 
The mass-action model (solid line) is shown for comparison. 
 
Figure 5a-c: Infection curves for R = 10m, 20m, and 40m. Simulated results (dots) 
and mass action model (solid line) are shown 
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Figure 5a 
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Figure 5b 
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Figure 5c 
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